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We report the results of a study that investigated the views of researchers working in seven
scientific disciplines and in history and philosophy of science in regard to four hypothe-
sized dimensions of scientific realism. Among other things, we found (i) that natural sci-
entists tended to express more strongly realist views than social scientists, (ii) that history
and philosophy of science scholars tended to express more antirealist views than natural
scientists, (iii) that van Fraassen’s characterization of scientific realism failed to cluster
with more standard characterizations, and (iv) that those who endorsed the pessimistic in-
duction were no more or less likely to endorse antirealism.1. Background. Some of themost central and long-lasting controversies in
philosophy of science have concerned various forms of ‘scientific realism’.
Historically, one important set of issues characterized in these terms con-
cerns the metaphysical status of unobservable entities and the semantic sta-
tus of theoretical terms. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, a
strand of positivistic idealism denied that unobservable entities could exist
independently of our minds (e.g., Pearson 1911). Similarly, in the heyday
of logical positivism, it was debated whether scientific theories should be in-
terpreted literally as being about mind-independent parts of the world. The*To contact the authors, please write to: James R. Beebe (University at Buffalo) and Finnur
Dellsén (University of Iceland and Inland Norway University of Applied Sciences).
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SCIENTIFIC REALISM IN THE WILD 337logical positivists denied this, arguing instead that theories should be inter-
preted as collections of actual or possible observations associated with the
theory (e.g., Schlick 1936). In analytic philosophy of science, these debates
are now largely considered settled in favor of the realist view that unobserv-
able entities do exist mind-independently and scientific theories are straight-
forwardly true or false depending on the state of the world (including its un-
observable aspects).1 In the current article, we refer to this as metaphysical
realism (MR).
Arguably, the central focus of recent debates under the heading of ‘sci-
entific realism’ has concerned the epistemic status of a privileged set of sci-
entific theories or theory parts. In this debate, scientific realists are roughly
those who claim that empirically successful scientific theories, including
what these theories say about unobservable entities, are typically at least ap-
proximately true. This statement of a type of epistemic realism (ER) is often
qualified in various ways, for example, as extending only to certain parts of
successful scientific theories, such as what these theories say about struc-
tures (Worrall 1989, 1994), causes (Cartwright 1983; Hacking 1983), or some
combination of both (Chakravartty 2007; Egg 2016). In support of ER, many
realists appeal to some version of the no-miracles argument (NMA) accord-
ing to which the approximate truth of current best theories can be inferred on
the basis of its being the best explanation of their empirical success (Smart
1963; Putnam 1975; Musgrave 1988; Psillos 1999). Against ER, many anti-
realists appeal to some version of the pessimistic induction (PI) according to
which current best theories will probably suffer the same fate as those numer-
ous historical theories that were successful at the time but have now been dis-
carded (Poincaré 1905/1952; Hesse 1976; Laudan 1981a; Stanford 2006).
While ER is arguably the most debated dimension of scientific realism,
there are other prominent debates in philosophy of science that have also
been characterized as concerning ‘scientific realism’. Van Fraassen rejected
ER as a legitimate definition of ‘scientific realism’, arguing that such a def-
inition should not refer to any specific set of scientific theories such as those
that are currently ‘best’ or ‘most successful’ (1980, 7; see also 2017, 95–97).
Instead, van Fraassen suggested that scientific realism amounts to the con-
junction of two theses about acceptance and the aim of science, whichwewill
refer to as van Fraassen realism (vFR): “Science aims to give us, in its the-
ories, a literally true story of what the world is like; and acceptance of a sci-
entific theory involves the belief that it is true” (1980, 8). Van Fraassen’s
antirealist alternative, constructive empiricism, denies both theses—roughly
by replacing ‘true’ with ‘empirically adequate’: “Science aims to give us1. We are aware of only two recent exceptions to this, i.e., Rowbottom (2011) and Frost-
Arnold (2014).
338 JAMES R. BEEBE AND FINNUR DELLSÉNtheories which are empirically adequate; and acceptance of a theory in-
volves as belief only that it is empirically adequate” (12).2
It is important to understand what exactly van Fraassen meant by char-
acterizing realism and antirealism in terms of ‘acceptance’ and what science
‘aims to give us’. In speaking of the ‘aim’ of science, van Fraassen is refer-
ring to the basic criterion of success for scientific theories, that is, the funda-
mental standards against which scientific theories should be judged (1980, 8;
see also 2017, 98). The realist claims that scientific theories should be true,
while the constructive empiricist insists that empirically adequate theories
are just as good as far as science is concerned. By ‘acceptance’, van Fraassen
is referring to whatever attitude scientists in fact have toward the theories
they use in their scientific endeavors (e.g., in their explanations, predictions,
and further theorizing; van Fraassen 1980, 12 and 151–52; see also Rosen
1994, 145). Thus, the issue of realism is partly about whether using theories
for these purposes involves believing that those theories are true or merely
that they are empirically adequate. Importantly, van Fraassen is adamant that
constructive empiricism makes no claim whatsoever about what individual
scientists do or should believe; rather, his concern is only with what kind of
belief (if any) is involved in the scientific enterprise as such (Forrest 1994;
Rosen 1994; van Fraassen 1994).
A final cluster of issues debated under the heading of ‘scientific realism’
concerns how science makes progress. In large part because of Bird’s (2007)
defense of an epistemic view of scientific progress, the nature of progress in
science has again become prominent in philosophy of science after lying dor-
mant for a few decades. In this debate, scientific realism is frequently char-
acterized as the idea that scientific progress is or involves getting closer to
the truth, including the underlying truth about unobservable entities. Thus,
what we will call progressive realism (PR) is the thesis that an episode in
science is progressive when scientists have a more accurate account of the
world, including its unobservable aspects, at the end of the episode than at
its beginning. This thesis is denied by antirealist accounts of scientific prog-
ress, such as Kuhn’s (1970) and Laudan’s (1977, 1981b) problem-solving
accounts and Rowbottom’s (2019) instrumentalist account, and affirmed in
different ways by various self-professed realist accounts (e.g., Bird 2007;
Niiniluoto 2014, 2017; Dellsén 2016).
Although each of the aforementioned strands of scientific realism has
been discussed and debated almost ad nauseam, there have been nearly no
empirical investigations into how scientists themselves view these issues.
This is surprising since working scientists are arguably in a better epistemic2. Roughly, a theory is empirically adequate in van Fraassen’s sense just in case it is cor-
rect in what it says about observable aspects of the world.
SCIENTIFIC REALISM IN THE WILD 339position with regard to a number of issues in these debates. For example,
working scientists would seem to be in the best position to evaluate the ep-
istemic merits of theories they currently accept, since they have access to,
and awareness of, a greater variety of evidence than others who might want
to evaluate these theories (including philosophers of science). Similarly,
scientists themselves are surely in a better position than philosophers to tell
whether their acceptance of a particular theory involves believing that the
theory is true (as per vFR). Although scientists are by no means infallible
judges of these matters, their opinions should at least be taken seriously
enough to have an impact on these debates.
The central aim of our study was to investigate the attitudes of working
scientists toward each strand of scientific realism: Are scientists themselves
scientific realists—and if so, in what sense? Our aim was also to investigate
the relationships between affirmations of different strands of realism, in or-
der to gauge the extent to which different realism debates really are distinct
in the minds of scientists themselves. Furthermore, we sought to compare the
attitudes of working scientists in different fields—physics, chemistry, biol-
ogy, economics, psychology, sociology, and anthropology—as well as to
compare the attitudes of working scientists with the attitudes of those who
study aspects of science that are of central relevance to scientific realism, that
is, scholars in history and philosophy of science (HPS). Finally, wewanted to
understand what other philosophical views about science, such as about the
theory ladenness (TL) of observation and the ability of science to explain ev-
erything eventually, were associated with different strands of scientific real-
ism within each field.
2. Materials, Procedure, and Participants. In order to probe the judg-
ments of scientists and HPS scholars about each of the dimensions of scien-
tific realism described above, we constructed the Scientific Realism Ques-
tionnaire (SRQ), the elements of which appear in table 1.3 Participants were
asked to read each statement and indicate the extent to which they agreed
or disagreed with it by selecting one of the following answer choices: com-
pletely disagree, mostly disagree, slightly disagree, neither agree nor disagree,
slightly agree, mostly agree, completely agree.
Most statements on the SRQ were formulated as statements of (some ver-
sion of ) scientific realism or some view that realists would probably be more
inclined to endorse. We endeavored to make the statements simple and easy
for scientists to understand and, thus, avoided semi-technical terms such as3. Our questionnaire included two additional statements about philosophical issues that
we later came to view as orthogonal to other issues in our study. In the interest of space,
we do not discuss these statements here.
340 JAMES R. BEEBE AND FINNUR DELLSÉN‘unobservable’, ‘empirical adequacy’, ‘acceptance’, ‘aim of science’, and
their cognates.4 For purposes of analysis, a response of ‘completely disagree’TABLE 1. QUESTIONNAIRE ITEMS
Item Type
1. The objects and phenomena studied by science exist independently of how
we conceive of or think about them.
MR
2. Even if we cannot be certain which scientific theories are ultimately true,
we can be certain that there is an ultimate truth out there waiting to be
discovered.
MR
3. Our most successful and rigorously tested scientific theories are at least
approximately true.
ER
4. Progress in science is a matter of getting closer and closer to the underlying
truth about reality.
PR
5. In order to go about their daily business as scientists, scientists do not need
to believe that any of the theories they rely upon provides them with
literally correct descriptions of the world.*
vFR
6. Scientific theories should not be judged on the basis of how accurately
they depict an underlying reality but rather on how useful they are in
helping us systematize our experiences and develop new technologies.*
vFR
7. The best explanation for the remarkable success of our best scientific
theories is that they accurately depict an underlying reality.
NMA
8. The fact that the history of science contains so many widely accepted
theories that turned out to be fundamentally mistaken should make us
skeptical about the scientific theories that are currently accepted.
PI
9. Disagreements in science can always be resolved by obtaining better data. Conv.
10. Over time, scientists from competing schools of thought will eventually
converge to a single perspective.
Conv.
11. There is no such thing as purely impartial scientific observation; all
observations in science are shaped and informed by one’s prior theoretical
commitments.
TL
12. Given enough time and resources, there is nothing science cannot explain. Sci.
13. Having different schools of thought within a scientific discipline is good
for the health of that discipline.
Dis.








of.”e found it most challenging to formulate vFR without the use of semi-
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SCIENTIFIC REALISM IN THE WILD 341to one of these statements was scored as 1, ‘mostly disagree’ as 2, and so on.
Responses to statements marked with an asterisk were reverse scored (e.g.,
‘strongly agree’was scored as 1). Each of the items in the SRQmakes a state-
ment about science as a whole rather than about any particular scientific dis-
cipline. It should be noted that NMA and PI are standardly formulated as ar-
guments about science as a whole rather than about particular sciences or
scientific theories. Nevertheless, in a follow-up study, we will develop a ques-
tionnaire that asks participants separately about natural and social science.
The first six statements on the SRQ concerned the central dimensions of
scientific realism. Statements 1 and 2 are formulations of MR. Item 3 is a
statement of ER. Statement 4 is an expression of PR. And statements 5
and 6 reject scientific realism as characterized by van Fraassen (vFR).
The remaining eight statements on the SRQ concerned additional features
of scientific practice, the responses to which we thought might shed light on
responses to the first six. Statements 7 and 8 represent two of the most prom-
inent arguments for and against ER in the philosophical literature (i.e., NMA
and PI). We hypothesized that participants’ responses to these statements
would correlate (positively and negatively, respectively) with their responses
to 3. Statements 9 and 10 express the expectation that scientific disagree-
ments are never ultimately fundamental, can always in principle be over-
come, and will be replaced by convergence of opinion when sufficient data
become available (Conv.). While these statements are not expressions of
MR, ER, or PR, we expected them to positively correlate with participants’
responses to 1–4.
We also hypothesized that a strong endorsement of the theory-ladenness of
observation (statement 11), positive views about expert disagreement (state-
ment 13), and perceptions of disagreement within science (statement 14)
would negatively predict participants’ realism scores and that agreement with
the view that science can explain everything (statement 12) would positively
predict them.
We recruited 1,798 scholars working in seven scientific disciplines (phys-
ics, chemistry, biology, economics, psychology, sociology, and anthropol-
ogy) and in HPS, and asked them to respond to the 14 statements on the
SRQ.5 Participants were recruited between November 2016 and July 2017
via professional listservs and direct e-mail invitations (e-mail addresses
were collected by hand from university departmental websites). The SRQ5. Among HPS scholars, 78% indicated that they were primarily philosophers of science,
31% of whom indicated they worked in something like an education department rather
than a philosophy department. And 7%ofHPS scholars indicated that theywere historians
of science. The remaining 15% of this participant group indicated that they worked in the
history and philosophy of science or science and technology studies, thus leaving it un-
clear whether they were primarily philosophers, historians, or something else. Only 23%
of those in the latter category indicated they worked in science and technology studies.
342 JAMES R. BEEBE AND FINNUR DELLSÉNwas hosted online. Test items were presented in counterbalanced order. Par-
ticipants were asked to indicate the scientific discipline in which theyworked
and to provide basic demographic information about their age, gender, eth-
nicity, native language, and highest degree earned. Participant demographics
are represented in table 2.
3. Results: Realism Scores. The mean responses from each discipline
to each item on the SRQ appear in table 3. Standard deviations appear in
parentheses.
We begin by discussing statistical analyses of participants’ responses to
statements 1–6 because these represent measures of what are taken to be the
central dimensions of scientific realism. Since participant responses to state-
ments 5 and 6 were reverse scored, a higher mean response to statements 1–
6 indicates a more strongly realist response. A series of Kruskal-Wallis tests
revealed significant between-discipline differences (all p ’ s < :001) in par-
ticipants’ responses to all statements.6
A number of theoretically significant facts are immediately apparent
from the first six rows of data in table 3. The most strongly realist responses
are found among natural scientists, and the least realist responses tend to be
found among anthropologists and HPS scholars. Responses are also more
strongly realist among natural scientists than among social scientists. Some
statements (e.g., 3, “Our most successful and rigorously tested scientific






Highest Degree (%) Native English
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Phy 317 51 17 3 6 92 74
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344 JAMES R. BEEBE AND FINNUR DELLSÉNresponses across the board, while other statements (e.g., 5, “In order to go
about their daily business as scientists, scientists do not need to believe that
any of the theories they rely upon provides them with literally correct de-
scriptions of the world”) garnered antirealist responses across the board.7
We decided in advance of collecting and analyzing data that the various dis-
ciplines in our study would be arranged in all tables and figures according
to traditional conceptions of what are the ‘hardest’ and ‘softest’ sciences.
We do not endorse these traditional characterizations, but it is noteworthy
that on almost all analyses we report, there is a significant downward trend
in the degree of realism expressed as one moves from ‘hardest’ to ‘softest’
science.
Kendall’s tau correlations between participants’ responses to the first six
statements on the SRQ are represented in table 4. As expected, participant
responses to the two statements of MR positively correlated with each other
fairly well. The two statements of vFR correlated moderately well together
but not as strongly as we anticipated. Statement 4, “Progress in science is a
matter of getting closer and closer to the underlying truth about reality,” cor-
related fairly strongly with statements of MR and ER.
In order to examine broader patterns in our data and the ways in which
participants’ responses to the first six items on the SRQ clustered together,
we conducted an exploratory factor analysis.8 The analysis resulted in the
two factors represented in the columns of table 5. The factor loadings rep-
resented in table 5 (i.e., the values in the two rightmost columns) corre-
spond (roughly) to the correlations between participants’ responses to each
statement and the underlying factor in question. Factor 1 explained 31.7%
of the variance in the data, while factor 2 explained 8.3%. The two factors
correlated to a moderate degree (r 5 :35). Thus, our factor analysis reveals
that the first four statements on the SRQ seem to be getting at the same un-
derlying phenomenon—at least when examined at a certain level of granu-
larity—but that this phenomenon is distinctively different from the one be-
ing measured by statements 5 and 6.
On the basis of the foregoing correlational and factor analyses and the phil-
osophical theorizing on which the SRQ was based, we calculated separate
scores for each of the dimensions of scientific realism that we studied for
each scientist who participated in our study. MR scores were obtained by7. Overall means: statement 3 5 5.5, statement 5 5 3.1.
8. We performed a principal axis factoring analysis with oblique (direct oblimin) rota-
tion. A Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy, which analyzes a data set
for how suitable it is for factor analysis, yielded a result of .73, which according to
Hutcheson and Sofroniou (1999) is ‘middling’. Bartlett’s test of sphericity was signif-
icant (df 5 15, x2 5 1, 964:19, p < :001). Kaiser’s (1960) eigenvalue greater than
1.0 rule, Cattell’s (1966) scree test, and a parallel analysis (O’Connor 2000) all indicated
that two factors should be extracted.
SCIENTIFIC REALISM IN THE WILD 345averaging participants’ responses to statement 1, “The objects and phenomena
studied by science exist independently of how we conceive of or think about
them,” and statement 2, “Even if we cannot be certain which scientific theo-
ries are ultimately true, we can be certain that there is an ultimate truth out
there waiting to be discovered.” Participants’ ER and PR scores were simply
their responses to statement 3, “Ourmost successful and rigorously tested sci-
entific theories are at least approximately true,” and statement 4, “Progress
in science is a matter of getting closer and closer to the underlying truth
about reality,” respectively. The vFR scores were calculated by averaging re-
sponses to statement 5, “In order to go about their daily business as scientists,
scientists do not need to believe that any of the theories they rely upon pro-
vides them with literally correct descriptions of the world,” and statement 6,
“Scientific theories should not be judged on the basis of how accurately they
depict an underlying reality but rather on how useful they are in helping us
systematize our experiences and develop new technologies.” Because partic-
ipants’ responses to statements 1–4 clustered together (i.e., loaded onto aTABLE 4. KENDALL’S TAU CORRELATION MATRIX FOR THE FIRST SIX STATEMENTS
ON THE SCIENTIFIC REALISM QUESTIONNAIRE
1 (MR) 2 (MR) 3 (ER) 4 (PR) 5 (vFR) 6 (vFR)
1 (MR) 1
2 (MR) .38*** 1
3 (ER) .25*** .27*** 1
4 (PR) .33*** .48*** .37*** 1
5 (vFR) .03 .09*** .04 .11*** 1
6 (vFR) .13*** .17*** .12*** .24*** .26*** 1Note.—MR 5 metaphysical realism; ER 5 epistemic realism; PR 5 progressive realism; vFR 5 van
Fraassen realism.
* Significant at the .05 level.
** Significant at the .01 level.
*** Significant at the .001 level.TABLE 5. PATTERN MATRIX FOR AN EXPLORATORY FACTOR
ANALYSIS OF DATA FROM STATEMENTS 1–6 OF THE
SCIENTIFIC REALISM QUESTIONNAIRE






6 (vFR) .59Note.—Factor loadings below .3 are suppressed. MR5metaphysical
realism; ER5 epistemic realism; PR5 progressive realism; vFR5 van
Fraassen realism.
346 JAMES R. BEEBE AND FINNUR DELLSÉNsingle factor), and because these statements represent the core dimensions of
scientific realism on a standard way of thinking about the matter, we also cal-
culated a standard scientific realism (SSR) score for each participant by av-
eraging together participants’ responses to these statements. Mean MR, ER,
PR, vFR, and SSR scores and 95% confidence intervals for each discipline
appear in figures 1–5. A series of Kruskal-Wallis tests revealed significant
between-discipline differences on each score.9 One-sampleWilcoxon signed
rank tests were conducted on each score for each discipline to determine
whether the observed distribution differed significantly from a hypothetical
distribution centered around the neutral midpoint of 4. In all figures, distribu-
tions that differed from the midpoint to a small extent are marked with a dag-
ger (y), distributions that differed to a medium extent are marked with a dou-
ble dagger, and distributions that differed to a large extent are marked with
triple dagger. Distributions whose measure of effect size fell below the con-
ventional threshold for a small effect received no mark.10Figure 1. Mean metaphysical realism scores, sorted by discipline.9. MR H (7) 5 214:23, p < :001; ER H(7) 5 139:62, p < :001; PR H(7) 5 226:04,
p < :001; vFR H(7) 5 47:28, p < :001; SSR H(7) 5 260:20, p < :001.
10. To measure these effect sizes, r values were calculated by dividing standardized test
statistics by the square root of the sample size. For each one-sample test, the sample size
used in the calculation was the sum of the actual sample size and an equally large hy-
pothetical sample. Although best known as measures of correlation strength, r values
can also be used as measures of effect size in other contexts.
Figure 2. Mean epistemic realism scores, sorted by discipline.Figure 3. Mean progressive realism scores, sorted by discipline.
Figure 4. Mean van Fraassen realism scores, sorted by discipline.Figure 5. Mean standard scientific realism scores, sorted by discipline.
SCIENTIFIC REALISM IN THE WILD 349With the exception of figure 4, we see common patterns in each of these
figures. There are higher realism scores among natural scientists than social
scientists, the views of HPS scholars strongly diverge from those of natural
scientists, and the views of HPS agree most closely with those of anthropol-
ogists (and sometimes sociologists). In most figures, means mostly fell sig-
nificantly above the neutral midpoint. Only in figure 4 did means generally
fall below the midpoint.
A series of post hoc REGWQ (Ryan-Einot-Gabriel-Welsch Q) range tests
were conducted in order to classify the mean responses of the eight disci-
plines represented in our study into distinct homogeneous subsets. REGWQ
tests place mean responses into distinct subsets if they differ significantly
from each other (at an a level of .05, controlling for the family-wise error
rate) and into the same subset otherwise. The results of these tests are repre-
sented in table 6.
In the second column of table 6, we can see that the natural sciences and
economics cluster into a subset at the top of the table with the highest MR
scores; that psychology, sociology, and HPS cluster into a second subset
with the next highest set of scores; and that anthropology appears by itselfTABLE 6. HOMOGENEOUS SUBSETS ON EACH SCORE, WITH DISCIPLINES
LISTED IN DESCENDING ORDER OF MEAN SCORE
Homogeneous
Subset MR Score ER Score PR Score vFR Score SSR Score
Subset 1 Phy Phy Bio Bio Phy
Chem Chem Chem Chem Chem
Bio Bio Econ Socio Bio
Econ Econ Phy Econ
Subset 2 Psy Chem Chem Chem Psy
Socio Bio Econ Socio Socio









Subset 4 HPS Anthro
AnthroNote.—MR 5 metaphysical realism; ER 5 epistemic realism; PR 5 progressive realism; vFR 5 van
Fraassen realism; SSR 5 standard scientific realism. Phy 5 physics; chem 5 chemistry; bio 5 biology;
econ 5 economics; psy 5 psychology; socio 5 sociology; anthro 5 anthropology; HPS 5 history and
philosophy of science.
350 JAMES R. BEEBE AND FINNUR DELLSÉNat the bottom with the lowest SSR score. With the exception of vFR scores,
something like this pattern is repeated in each of the other columns.11
Aswe noted above, we hypothesized that the realism scores of natural sci-
entists would be higher than those of social scientists and that the realism
scores of social scientists working in disciplines that rely primarily on quan-
titative methods would be higher than those of scientists in disciplines where
qualitative methods are common. In order to test this hypothesis more clearly,
we sorted scientists’ SSR scores into three groups. Physics, chemistry, and bi-
ology were combined into natural science; economics and psychology were
combined into social science where quantitative methods predominate; and
sociology and anthropology were combined into social science where quali-
tative methods are common. The means scores of these three groups, together
with those of HPS scholars, are represented in figure 6.
A Kruskal-Wallis test revealed a significant between-group difference on
this score (H (3) 5 219:63,p < :001).Post hocMann-Whitney tests indicated
significant pair-wise differences between each paired participants group
( p ’s < :001), except for HPS and the qualitative social sciences (p5 :52).12
That is, (i) natural scientists had significantly higher SSR scores than social
scientists or HPS scholars, (ii) social scientists in disciplines where quantita-
tive methods predominate had significantly higher SSR scores than HPS
scholars and social scientists where qualitative methods are common, and
(iii) social scientists in more qualitative disciplines did not differ significantly
from HPS scholars.
4. Results: Additional Factors. We now turn our attention to analyses
of data from the remaining eight statements on the SRQ. A Kendall’s tau
correlation matrix for these statements, showing their correlations among
themselves and with the first six statements, appears in table 7. Participant
responses to statement 7, “The best explanation for the remarkable success
of our best scientific theories is that they accurately depict an underlying
reality” (which expresses NMA), correlated fairly strongly with responses
to statements about each of the standard dimensions of scientific realism
(i.e., statements 1–4). Surprisingly, statement 8, “The fact that the history
of science contains so many widely accepted theories that turned out to
be fundamentally mistaken should make us skeptical about the scientific11. Because physics includes some rather speculative theories and because of the heavy use
of idealizations in economics, we had hypothesized that scientists from these two disci-
plines would score lower than other scientists on the vFR dimension. Our data confirmed
this expectation. However, we did not anticipate the strongly realist responses of sociolo-
gists and the strongly antirealist responses of psychologists to the vFR statements.
12. For all Mann-Whitney tests reported, a Bonferroni correction was used to control for
an inflated type I error rate.
SCIENTIFIC REALISM IN THE WILD 351theories that are currently accepted” (which represents PI), did not strongly
correlate with participant responses to any other statement.
Responses to statement 9, “Disagreements in science can always be
resolved by obtaining better data,” and statement 10, “Over time, scientists
from competing schools of thought will eventually converge to a single per-
spective,” correlated moderately well with each other, with responses to the
four statements about the standard dimensions of scientific realism, and with
NMA (i.e., 7).
As expected, responses to statement 11, “There is no such thing as purely
impartial scientific observation; all observations in science are shaped and
informed by one’s prior theoretical commitments,” negatively correlated with
responses to statements that expressed realist sentiments. They also positively
correlatedwith statement 13, “Havingdifferent schools of thoughtwithin a sci-
entific discipline is good for the health of that discipline,” and statement 14,
“There is a significant amount of persistent disagreement in my field [in sci-
ence]”—although none of these correlations were as large as expected. Also as
expected, responses to statement 12, “Given enough time and resources,
there is nothing science cannot explain,” correlated most strongly with re-
sponses to statements of PR and the replacement of disagreement with conver-


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































SCIENTIFIC REALISM IN THE WILD 353correlated with expressions of scientific realism, but only to a small or negli-
gible degree.
In order to examine how the 14 statements on the SRQ clustered together,
we performed a second exploratory factor analysis, this time using all of the
data from the SRQ.13 The analysis resulted in the four factors represented in
table 8.
Participants’ responses to the four standard dimensions of scientific real-
ism (statements 1–4) clustered together with their responses to a statement of
NMA (7) and (albeit to a lesser extent) to a statement that competing schools
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354 JAMES R. BEEBE AND FINNUR DELLSÉNfactor includes the previous SSR statements, we refer to it as ‘SSR1’. Sci-
entists’ mean SSR1 scores are represented in figure 7 and displayed ac-
cording to the same broad disciplinary categorization used in figure 6. A
Kruskal-Wallis test revealed significant between-group differences on this
score (H(3) 5 275:52, p < :001). Post hoc Mann-Whitney tests indicated
significant pair-wise differences between each paired participants group
(p ’ s < :001), except for HPS and the qualitative social sciences ( p5 :26).
Statements 11, 13, and 14 formed a second cluster characterized by an em-
brace of theoretical diversity (TD) and the pervasiveness and penetrability of
such diversity. The mean TD scores of scientists in our study are represented
in figure 8. AKruskal-Wallis test revealed a significant between-group differ-
ence on this score (H(3) 5 176:17, p < :001). Post hoc Mann-Whitney tests
indicated significant pair-wise differences between each paired participants
group ( p ’ s < :001), except for HPS and the quantitative social sciences
( p 5 :56).
Our statement of PI (8) failed to load to an appreciable extent onto any of
the four resulting factors—that is, responses to this statement failed to clus-
ter with responses to any other statement to an appreciable extent. Since fac-
tor loadings below .3 were suppressed, the row for this statement in table 8
is blank. The statements that concerned vFR (5 and 6) again failed to cluster
with any other statements in the analysis.Figure 7. Mean standard scientific realism1 scores, sorted by broad disciplinary
category.
SCIENTIFIC REALISM IN THE WILD 355Statements 9 and 12 clustered together around a factor that seems to in-
volve a kind of optimism about science’s eventual ability to explain the
world and resolve disagreements. Disciplinary differences on scientific op-
timism (SO) are represented in figure 9. A Kruskal-Wallis test revealed sig-
nificant between-group differences on this score (H (3) 5 125:51, p < :001).
Post hoc Mann-Whitney tests indicated significant pair-wise differences be-
tween each paired participants group ( p ’ s < :001), except for HPS and the
qualitative social sciences ( p 5 :24).
Correlations between the four factors described above are depicted in ta-
ble 9. As might be expected, higher SO scores predicted higher SSR1
scores. Higher TD scores predicted lower SSR1 scores, lower vFR scores,
and lower SO scores.
5. Discussion. We turn now to a discussion of the significance of these re-
sults for debates about scientific realism and our understanding of science
more broadly. One of themost significant of our findings concerns differences
in philosophical opinions between HPS scholars and scientists in the quan-
titative sciences studied here, which include natural scientists (physicists,
chemists, and biologists) and some social scientists (economists and psy-
chologists). In particular, HPS scholars differed significantly from natural
scientists on our measures of MR, ER, and PR and in our overall measures
of standard scientific realism (SSR and SSR1). Furthermore, HPS scholarsFigure 8. Mean theoretical diversity scores, sorted by broad disciplinary category.
356 JAMES R. BEEBE AND FINNUR DELLSÉNdiffered significantly from quantitative scientists with regard to SO. By con-
trast, HPS scholars were significantly in step with the generally more anti-
realist qualitative scientists in our study (sociologists and anthropologists)
with regard to all of these measures.
Since the quantitative sciences are the sciences that HPS scholars have
studied most extensively—especially in debates about scientific realism—
this almost certainly reflects a real difference in opinion between HPS schol-
ars and their subject matter (i.e., scientists themselves). What could explain
such a discrepancy? AnHPS-friendly explanation is that HPS scholars have,
whereas quantitative scientists have not, learned about the significant histor-
ical and philosophical challenges facing the various types of scientific real-
ism involved in our study. Relatedly, it could be suggested that quantitative
scientists have been indoctrinated by an overly realist and optimistic view ofFigure 9. Mean scientific optimism scores, sorted by broad disciplinary category.TABLE 9. FACTOR CORRELATION MATRIX
SSR1 TD vFR SO
SSR1 1
TD 2.35 1
vFR .27 2.24 1
SO .45 2.22 .17 1Note.—SSR 5 standard scientific realism; TD 5 theoretical diversity; vFR 5 van
Fraassen realism; SO 5 scientific optimism.
SCIENTIFIC REALISM IN THE WILD 357science, whereas HPS scholars have not been subject to such propaganda. In
favor of this explanation, one could appeal to Kuhn’s (1970, 136–43) obser-
vation that textbooks in natural science tend to present a selective and dis-
torted view of the history of science as a series of great achievements accumu-
lated over time. Since such textbooks are arguably more central to the training
of quantitative scientists than qualitative scientists, thismight also explainwhy
the qualitative scientists in our study (sociologists and anthropologists) align
themselves more closely with HPS scholars than our quantitative scientists.14
A more HPS-critical type of explanation of our results lays the blame on
the picture painted of science within HPS. On this explanation, it would be
claimed that HPS scholars often present an impoverished or simplistic view
of science in which skeptical and antirealist arguments will seem stronger
than they are. We note three ways in which this challenge could be substan-
tiated. First, it could be argued that HPS scholars are trained and encouraged
to emphasize the role of historically contingent factors in the development of
science, such as the influence of social and political values. Conversely, HPS
scholars will tend to reject as uninteresting or ‘whiggish’ research into scien-
tific developments in which scientists simply adopted theories on the basis of
strong empirical evidence. As a consequence, it would be argued, HPS schol-
ars are presentedwith a picture of science that is skewed toward antirealism.15
Second,much historical work that is meant to challenge scientific realism (ER
in particular) proceeds from studying one or a few instances of scientific the-
ories that were, in retrospect, false or insufficiently supported by the available
evidence. However, quantitative scientists may be skeptical of placing much
stock onwhat is essentially anecdotal evidence andmay furthermore have rea-
sons to think that the cases in question are not representative of the currently
accepted theories in their fields. Third, working scientists may well have ac-
cess to a variety of unstated or ‘tacit’ evidence that is not—and perhaps could
not be—reported in scientific articles and documents but that nevertheless jus-
tifiably increases their levels of confidence in currently accepted theories.16
Scientific conclusions thatmay appear from the outside to be blind leaps of faith,
or overconfidence in a particular theory, may in fact be grounded in a tacit but
nevertheless justified understanding of the scientific subject matter in question.
Another significant finding concerns the differences in realist tendencies
between scientific disciplines. In a recent study, Robinson, Gonnerman, and
O’Rourke (2019) investigated differences in the philosophical opinions of14. We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for the suggestion of appealing to text-
books in elaborating this explanation.
15. We are grateful to another anonymous reviewer for suggesting this explanation.
16. This type of tacit evidence would presumably be especially common in heavily ex-
perimental sciences, which would seem to include the sciences we have characterized as
‘quantitative’ (with the possible exception of economics).
358 JAMES R. BEEBE AND FINNUR DELLSÉN264 scientists classified into three different branches of science, ‘life sci-
ences’, ‘physical sciences and mathematics’ and ‘social and behavioral sci-
ences’. For our purposes, their most relevant results concern two philosoph-
ical statements that Robinson et al. characterize as concerning ‘reality’, that
is, “Scientific claims need not represent objective reality to be useful” (re-
ality 2) and “The subject of my research is a human construct” (reality 4).
Robinson et al. found statistically significant differences between scientists
in life sciences and social and behavioral sciences on reality 2. They also
found statistically significant differences on reality 4 between life science
and physical sciences and mathematics, on the one hand, and social and be-
havioral sciences, on the other hand.
In comparison to Robinson et al. (2019), our study is much larger and
more powerful (1,798 participants as compared with 264), employed a more
fine-grained categorization of scientific fields (seven ‘disciplines’ rather than
three ‘branches’), and probed more specific and precisely stated opinions re-
garding scientific realism.17 However, our study partially confirmed Rob-
inson et al.’s results insofar as “The subject of my research is a human con-
struct” (reality 4) corresponds to (the denial of ) our statement 1: “The objects
and phenomena studied by science exist independently of how we conceive
of or think about them.” In our study, psychologists, sociologists and anthro-
pologists scored significantly lower than biologists (who most clearly repre-
sent the life sciences in our study; all p ’s < :05). Indeed, the former fields also
scored much lower than chemists and physicists (p ’s < :001), which would
presumably be classified as ‘physical sciences’ byRobinson et al. Interestingly,
however, Robinson et al. did not observe a statistically significant difference
between their ‘physical sciences and mathematics’ and ‘social and behavioral
sciences’ on reality 4. From the point of view of our study, this is an anomaly
that may be explained by the inclusion of mathematics in the former branch.
After all, it is plausible that a nontrivial number of mathematicians see the
subject of their research—mathematical objects—as a ‘human construct’
(in line with intuitionism about mathematics; see Iemhoff 2013).1817. We also believe that the statements we asked our participants to evaluate provide for
a better reflection of the issues that lie at the heart of the various scientific realism de-
bates in philosophy of science. In particular, we find it doubtful that any sensible scien-
tific realist would claim that scientific theories must represent objective reality in order
to be useful (reality 2), since it is widely acknowledged—even among realists—that ide-
alizations play an indispensable role in science (e.g., Elliot-Graves and Weisberg 2014).
18. We find it harder to locate a statement corresponding to reality 2 (the other statement
about which Robinson et al. (2019) obtained statistically significant results concerning
between-branch differences) within our study—in part because we do not think reality 2
quite corresponds to anything seriously debated in the realism literature (see n. 17). Never-
theless, for our statement 5, which bears some similarity to Robinson et al.’s reality 2, we
observed significant differences between the responses from biology and each of the social
and behavioral sciences (economics, psychology, sociology, anthropology; all p ’ s < :01).
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sults about differences between scientific fields to a number of issues regard-
ing scientific realism. In the broadest terms, our results show that quantitative
sciences such as physics and economics appear to be much more inclined to-
ward standard forms of scientific realism than qualitative sciences such as so-
ciology and anthropology. These differences were especially pronounced with
regard to metaphysical statements about objective truth and mind-independent
reality (MR) and whether scientific progress involves more accurate repre-
sentation of underlying reality (PR). This may in part be explained by the fact
that the subject matter of sociology and anthropology are arguably more sub-
jective and malleable by human intervention than the subject matter of the
natural sciences. However, this conjecture seems inadequate to explain why
economics aligns itself so closely with the natural sciences, given that the sub-
ject matter of economics is similar in the aforementioned respects. A better
explanationmay thus appeal to the fact that economics tends to employ a sim-
ilar methodology as the natural sciences in our study, with a heavy emphasis
on quantitative methods. For example, it may be that dedicating oneself to
quantitative methods instills a realist mind-set about one’s theories and their
relation to evidence. Alternatively, those who come to appreciate using quan-
titative methods may be somehow predisposed toward realism. Again, these
issues would need to be investigated further.
So far in this sectionwe have focused onwhatwe label SSR (statements 1–
4), which cluster with statements of NMAand scientific convergence to a sin-
gle perspective (statements 7 and 10). As we have noted, responses to these
statements did not cluster with vFR, defined as a two-tiered thesis about the
belief involved in acceptance of a theory and the basic criterion for success in
science. This suggests that not only does van Fraassen’s approach differ from
the ways other philosophers of science have defined scientific realism but
also that vFR may not connect in substantial ways with the broad set of is-
sues involved in other discussions of scientific realism. On the one hand, this
is not surprising given that van Fraassen’s intention was to restructure the
scientific realism debate in light of what he saw as an inadequate conception
of the underlying issue. On the other hand, it may be worrying for van
Fraassen that our participants apparently did not see him as addressing the
same philosophical issue as other contributors to the scientific realism debate.
Presumably, the goal of van Fraassen’s restructuring of the debate was to
capture a logically distinct but closely associated set of issues; if so, our data
suggest that this restructuring was not entirely successful.
With that said, another interesting result of our study is that the two state-
ments of different aspects of vFR did cluster together. This suggests that
van Fraassen’s two claims about the belief involved in acceptance and sci-
ence’s criterion of success do indeed ‘come as a package’ in the minds of
scientists, as opposed to being two entirely separate issues that can be treated
360 JAMES R. BEEBE AND FINNUR DELLSÉNindependently of each other. Discussing these claims independently of
each other, as philosophers of science often do in their treatment of van
Fraassen’s constructive empiricism (e.g., Dicken 2010), might thus be some-
what misleading.
Yet another interesting result is how popular van Fraassen’s type of scien-
tific antirealism appears to be in all of the scientific disciplines in our study,
both absolutely and relative to other forms of scientific realism (MR, ER,
and PR). In analytic philosophy of science, where nearly all the debate about
van Fraassen’s conception of realism and antirealism has taken place, very
few have aligned themselves with van Fraassen’s constructive empiricism
or any other position that counts as antirealist on van Fraassen’s definition.19
However, our results suggest that this is by far the most popular version of
antirealism among scientists, and this holds for each of the scientific disci-
plines studied here (compare fig. 4 to figs. 1, 2, 3, and 5). It is noteworthy
in this regard that many well-known scientists have publicly expressed posi-
tions that are very similar to van Fraassen’s antirealism (e.g., Hawking and
Mlodinow’s [2010] ‘model-dependent realism’). Such anecdotal evidence
for the popularity of a van Fraassen–style antirealism about science can
now be backed up with more systematic support.
The relative popularity of van Fraassen–style antirealism among scientists
is also significant in light of the exchange between van Fraassen (1994) and
Rosen (1994) about the nature of constructive empiricism. In brief, their ex-
change concerned the relationship between the scientific realism debate, as
construed by van Fraassen, and the intentions of individual scientists. Rosen
claimed that the debate could not simply be about scientists’ own understand-
ing of the aim of science, since that should be settled by a sociological inves-
tigation in which scientists are simply asked for their personal opinions on the
matter. In van Fraassen’s response, he acknowledged that scientific realism
and constructive empiricism are not straightforward empirical claims that
could be directly tested by a sociological investigation of this sort, due pri-
marily to the fact that who counts as scientists in the first place will be deter-
mined in part by one’s view of what it is to do science, which is in turn de-
termined by science’s criterion of success. Any sociological investigation
into the extent to which scientists are realists or antirealists would thus be
complicated by a “hermeneutic circle” in which the extension of ‘science’19. Some exceptions in which van Fraassen’s constructive empiricism is defended (with
various important qualifications) include Bueno (1999), Muller (2004), Cartwright (2007),
and Dellsén 2017; see also Wray (2007, 2008, 2010) for defenses of van Fraassen’s argu-
ments against realism. Most other contributions to the literature criticize constructive em-
piricism in oneway or another (see, e.g., Churchland 1985,Musgrave 1985;Horwich 1991;
Psillos 1996; Ladyman 2000, Alspector-Kelly 2001, Dicken and Lipton 2006).
SCIENTIFIC REALISM IN THE WILD 361is partly determined by the aim of science and vice versa (van Fraassen 1994,
188–92).
It is not clear to us exactly where van Fraassen lands on the issue of
whether vFR could be investigated empirically by surveying scientists.20
However, our own view is that the opinions held by scientists themselves
are at least highly relevant to evaluating vFR (and van Fraassen’s antirealist
alternative, constructive empiricism), since it surely counts against a philo-
sophical account if it must attribute to scientists substantial and widespread
misconceptions about science’s own criterion of success and what is in fact
involved in accepting a scientific theory.21 Our impression is that many phi-
losophers of science have assumed that this type of empirical study would
count in favor of vFR and against constructive empiricism (see, e.g., Rosen
1994, 145–46). Our study suggests that the opposite is true. Indeed, every
single discipline’s mean vFR score fell on or below the midpoint. This indi-
cates that most scientists are antirealists of some kind on van Fraassen’s con-
ception of the debate.
There are many other interesting correlations in our data, but we restrict
ourselves to highlighting two further results. First, it is noteworthy how
closely agreement with PR—the idea that progress is a matter of getting
closer to the underlying truth—correlates with other forms of realism, MR
and ER, and the associated NMA. Second, we were surprised to find no
strong correlation in our data between standard forms of scientific realism,
SSR, and what is usually taken as the main argument against scientific real-
ism (i.e., PI; statement 8). It is worth noting that the same is not true for the
most popular type of argument in favor of scientific realism (i.e., NMA; state-
ment 7), which correlates very strongly with ER and PR (see table 7) and
clusters with SSR (see table 8). This suggests that, in contrast to most philos-
ophers of science, scientists who endorse PI do not view it as posing a serious
challenge to ER and PR. Perhaps, then, the realist response to PI that is most
likely to be found convincing among working scientists will not consist in20. Van Fraassen certainly seems to suggest that an empirical investigation would be rel-
evant in someway or another, at least as an indication of whether vFR, or his own construc-
tive empiricism, could be offered as plausible account of the aim of science on a standard
or common definition of ‘science’. However, this interpretative question about how van
Fraassen should be understood lies outside the scope of this article.
21. To be sure, this is not the only consideration relevant to evaluating vFR and its anti-
realist alternatives—they would also need to explain the standards for scientific theory ac-
ceptance, scientists’ practice of providing explanations for observable phenomena, and so
forth—but we fail to see any good reason to ignore this type of consideration entirely. How-
ever, with the exception of some rather inconclusive evidence provided by Jones (2003),
this is exactly what has occurred in the debate about vFR and its alternatives in the philos-
ophy of science literature.
362 JAMES R. BEEBE AND FINNUR DELLSÉNrebutting this antirealist argument but rather in articulating a form of scien-
tific realism that is unambiguously compatible with the PI.22 We hope that
the findings we report here regarding the judgments of scientists and HPS
scholars about different dimensions of scientific realism will lead to fruitful
discussions about the nature of scientific realism and the relationship be-
tween scientific practices and philosophical theorizing about those practices.REFERENCES
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